Proxy wars are still under-represented in conflict research and a key cause for this is the lack of conceptual and terminological care. This article seeks to demonstrate that minimizing terminological diffusion increases overall analytical stability by maximising conceptual rigor. The argument opens with a discussion on the terminological ambivalence resulting from the haphazard employment of labels referencing the parties involved in proxy wars. Here, the article introduces an analytical framework with a two-fold aim: to reduce label heterogeneity, and to argue in favour of understanding proxy war dynamics as overlapping dyads between a Beneficiary, a Proxy, and a Target. This is then applied to the issues of defining and theorising party dynamics in proxy wars. It does so by providing a structural-relational analysis of the interactions between the above-mentioned parties based on strategic interaction. It presents a tentative explanation of the proxy relationship by correlating the Beneficiary's goal towards the Target with the Proxy's preference for the Beneficiary. In adding the goal-preference relational heuristic, the article advances the recent focus on strategic interaction with a novel variant to explanations based on interest, power, cost-benefit considerations, or ideology.
Introduction
Conceptual debates stand to correct theoretical and methodological ambivalences across a wide range of sub-fields in international relations. Often disregarded as metatheoretical trivia 1 , concept analyses focus on the perils of operating with notions with unclear boundaries, conflicting meanings, and divergent empirical referents. Their aims are straightforward: attaining clarity, ensuring precision, and building stable conceptual standing(s). Security 2 , terrorism 3 , and war 4 are a small sample of terms subjected to conceptual scrutiny in the discipline of international relations. Nevertheless, even established research clusters, such as that addressing civil war, still use concepts inconsistently and imperfectly 5 . Given the nascent state of proxy wars research, it comes as no surprise that such discussions are almost entirely absent, despite having important consequences to our understanding of the topic, chiefly of which their effect on knowledge cumulation 6 .
As recently noted by Brown, 'the issue of proxy warfare has again been rising up the international agenda' 7 . Notwithstanding the erroneous overlap between proxy warfare and proxy war 8 , Brown highlights the growing interest in the topic 9 . As the gap in the 3 knowledge of proxy wars slowly narrows, it is striking to note, however, that this cluster of research is still at a critical, pre-theoretical stage. For example, attempts at theoretical examinations of causal dynamics in proxy wars are rather scarce. On the one hand, Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham put forward a theory of external support hinging on principal-agent assumptions and a demand-supply logic 10 . On the other, San-Akca developed a strategic interaction model involving two simultaneous selection pathways:
from the state towards the non-state actor, and from the non-state actor towards the state 11 .
These are complemented by country-or region-focused research which reveals interesting, albeit partial, insights into why proxy wars are waged 12 . However, no overarching theory has emerged, and the existing models complement, rather than integrate each other.
This article argues that a first step in overcoming this issue is a joint terminologicalconceptual exploration of the term 'proxy war'. Essentially, the article focuses on conceptual assessment as constitutive of the theoretical micro-foundations of proxy war research. However, for proxy wars, this is not as straightforward, for conceptual inquiry requires a deconstruction of the meaning of proxy wars as acts of violence taking the form of indirect intervention. As Mumford put it, proxy wars are indirect third-party engagements in conflicts aimed at influencing strategic outcomes. They are constitutive of 'a relationship between a benefactor, who is a state or non-state actor external to the dynamic of an existing conflict, and their chosen proxies who are the conduit for weapons, training and funding from the benefactor' 13 . From a conceptual point of view, this implies ordering meaning 4 across the complex interactions resulting between the party requiring indirect intervention, the party carrying it out, and the actual target of indirect intervention.
Nevertheless, it is at this level that research has produced a theoretically misleading terminological diffusion. Specifically, the three parties engaged in proxy wars display extraordinary label variance that not only presents limited substantive utility but adds unnecessary polemic to an already contentious topic. In the literature, the use of labels has followed the path of adapting terminology into 'novel' conceptualisations of proxy wars:
choices over pairs of labels, for example, 'patron' -'client' or 'benefactor' -'pawn', are usually deemed semantically sufficient to mark conceptual innovation. This is a significant issue and the argument the article makes is simple, yet relevant: by minimising and reducing the semantically crowded field of labels ascribed to the parties involved in proxy wars, we develop a more stable and easily definable concept, allowing it to maximise both academic and policy tract.
An emphasis on the semantics surrounding the notion of 'proxy war' matters because we are still 'conceptually under-equipped to grasp, let alone counter, violent political challenges.' 14 By questioning the language we use to assess proxy wars, this article firstly taps into the recent turn towards conceptual analyses of violence-related phenomena.
For example, the study of counterinsurgency has been subject to conceptual reassessment.
On the one hand, there have been attempts to apply a unifying conceptual approach to counterinsurgency under the rubric of 'violent politics' that would link strategies to shifts in 5 warfare. 15 On the other, the increasing reliance on delegative strategies -military, political, operational, technological -led Waldman to introduce the notion of 'vicarious warfare'.
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Second, a focus on semantics matters because language, as Fierke put it, has a central role in how we analyse and communicate about the world. 17 It is through language that one selects not just a name for the observed phenomenon, but where it starts and ends, as well as how one understands and explains it. 18 More importantly, as names, labels, or terminologies are assigned to phenomena a series of normative, epistemological, and ontological associations are attached to the named subject. 19 Yet, these concerns are usually ignored either because they are buried within methodological/theoretical predilections or because the concept itself is seen as largely self-evident. 'Proxy war' is far from being a selfevident concept and attaining some form of conceptual and terminological determinacy is crucial to moving the debate forward.
Finally, a focus on the terminology-concept links offers a window into smoother practitioner cooperation. No matter how specialised a concept is, it manages to permeate the public and popular discourse 20 , and this is evident about proxy wars. The first section presents a terminological assessment designed to reduce heterogeneity of labels by identifying problems resulting from their interchangeable use. It introduces the analytical framework and then attempts a corrective measure by building a case for the employment of a connotative-free set of labels: Beneficiary, Proxy, and Target. propose one in which the choice of proxy is dependent on the target, and the willingness of the proxy to accept delegation of violence is formulated by its preference, or lack thereof, for its supporter. This presents the essence of the phenomenon as a process resulting from complex, relational, and politico-strategic interaction as opposed to one based on interest, power, cost-benefit considerations, or ideology.
Minimizing Terminological Reach 8
To begin with, it is important to note that proxy wars have been studied across several research clusters dealing directly or indirectly with the topic: Cold War historiography 27 , intelligence studies 28 , and the emerging research on external support and proxy wars 29 . The latter now also includes research on external support and its effects on group cohesion and performance 30 , the role of proxy actors in electoral violence 31 , and war termination. 32 Adding to this is the study of proxy actors as key operatives of military purges 33 and wartime sexual violence 34 , and, finally, as swapping roles and functions with (other) nonstate actors, most notably, militias 35 . Taken together, these mark a much-needed progression in our understanding of the phenomena of war by proxy, hitherto classed as understudied 36 .
However, this cross-cluster dissemination is relevant to the terminological and conceptual problem discussed here because it points to its endogenous nature. Do different foci require and, therefore, produce different conceptual alternatives for the parties engaged in proxy wars? Or does conceptual plurality in fact inhibit unified scholarly debate?
Endogeneity appears then, not only to simply preclude this analysis, but to also be an intrinsic part of it. In doing so, it can simultaneously deter conceptual analysis by offering the easy way out of calling 'proxy war' an essentially contested concept 37 , or it can become a matter of puzzlement. Against this background, I treat terminological pluralism and its 9 effects on conceptual rigor as a curious quandary by reflecting only on the literatures dealing with external support and proxy wars.
In proxy war research, terminology does not concern the label for the phenomenon itself, but those applicable to the parties involved in proxy wars: the party requiring indirect Nevertheless, what is inconsistent in the literature, and can be easily noted above, is the terminology employed in relation to each of the three parties. This section of the article challenges the need for this excessive heterogeneity of labels arguing that terminological shifts affect the overall meaning of 'proxy war' by assigning meaning and value ex ante. This problem underscores the importance of this discussion on the semantics surrounding proxy wars because the employment of such a terminological roster assigns plural ontological and epistemological meanings to the overall concept. This section seeks to establish an optimal use of labels that minimizes the terminological reach and sets the basis for achieving stronger conceptual rigor. It introduces a framework aimed at determining a pairing of labels that speak to what the literature has agreed is a stable set of properties of proxy wars -third party, indirect intervention -while underlying the interactive and mutually constitutive nature of relationship. The framework includes two criteria: normative endorsement, and relational enforcement. I classify the first one in 'low'
and 'high' categories, and the second into 'positive' and 'negative', operationalization explained below.
In political science, normative benchmarks and choices over theoretical schools or frameworks have significant bearing on the phenomena to which they are applied. The 11 criterion of endorsement explores the links between 'proxy war' and the usual tendency to normatively embed the phenomenon in the ideological fabric of the Cold War. Bar-Siman
Tov's terminological choices make a case in point: the Activator-Proxy relationship is an expression of power which ultimately allows the achievement of the Activator's strategic goals and political interests at a lower level of risk, irrespective of the role and position of the proxy 64 . This has become a standard depiction of a proxy, and some of the earliest analyses of the Syrian proxy wars drew immediate comparisons to superpower adventurism in the Third World, claiming that the American-Russian approach to Syria was of Cold War essence 65 . This is a problem because it positions an incompatibility in a faulty theoretical framework without any discussion of either party's goals. More importantly, it falls victim to the same unwarranted politicisation of explanations which the article presented as rationale for the need of semantic analysis.
As a classificatory criterion, endorsement is rooted in Freeden's notions of 'ideological morphology' and 'thought edifices' which reference a concept's frame of political conduct and action by linking word and meaning 'with a particular conception of human nature, a particular conception of social structure, of justice, of liberty, of authority' 66 .
I focus on ideological normativity because of an existing bias in proxy wars research towards presenting the term as ideologically confined to superpower rivalry. Because of the long history of proxy wars during the Cold War, research has tended to reject ex ante the potential ability of the concept of 'proxy wars' to capture the realities of twenty-first century violence 67 . This complaint is also made by Tamm 68 and San-Akca 69 in whose understanding, 'proxy war' seems to be supra-rationalised by the Cold War ideological struggle as a 'virtual freeze-frame' 70 . Because of this, assessing label accuracy through the lens of its normative prescriptiveness helps determine conceptual clarity outside the West-East Cold War framework. By reflecting on normativity, the framework filters labels by presenting an accurately contextualised concept useful for both research and policy.
Complementing the evaluation of normative prescription, is the second criterion:
existence or absence of control levels between the supporting and receiving parties.
Endorsement is matched by enforcement, understood as the ability of a label to imply negative or positive enforcement of control in the proxy war relationship: negative implying total subordination, positive marking a cooperative relationship along the lines of collusion 71 . This is intended to identify labels that reflect the strategic interaction between the parties, rather than labels that assign the role of proxy as an attribute. Given this brief, albeit telling, example, the article attempts to bridge the need for minimizing terminological reach with that of maximising conceptual rigor, by presenting a set of labels able to harness analytical power of the endorsement-enforcement spectrum. It proposes that parties engaged in proxy wars be labelled in the following way: the party requesting indirect intervention as 'beneficiary', the party providing indirect intervention as 'proxy', and the party being acted upon through indirect intervention as 'target'. The changes are minor, yet significant, and are not a matter of simple stylistic choice. Given the Russian refusal to portray the Syrian situation as a civil war and its instance on labelling rebel groups as terrorists, clarity over terminology seems more important than ever.
The choice of 'beneficiary' is justified in the light of the fact that Mumford's 'benefactor' is one-dimensional: the meaning of 'benefactor' is oriented more toward the party's responsibility for the Proxy. This is also the case of Salehyan's use of 'Principal'.
Using 'beneficiary' links the party proving support to the overall aims of the delegation of violence in relation to the Target, while not denying the Proxy a degree of self-orientation.
The label 'Proxy' is used as it is the least connotative on the endorsement-enforcement scale in comparison with that of 'client', 'subordinate', 'pawn' or 'satellite'. Lastly, the notion of 'target' is consistent with San-Akca's emphasis on its value to strategic interaction 88 . This separates the notion from that of a normal proxy target which is a party that becomes a target only through proximity to the conflict. Thus, the use of 'beneficiary', 'proxy' and 'target' highlights the triadic interactions as the core of the phenomenon described by the concept of 'proxy war' in a connotation-free and more nuanced way.
Maximizing Conceptual Rigor: Explaining Party Dynamics in Proxy Wars
The terminological system presented previously helps maximise the term's rigor by shifting the focus on the interactions that form the core of the phenomenon: the triadic Beneficiary-Proxy-Target relationship. In doing so it invites a reconsideration of how we define and explain proxy wars. This section discusses how terminological stability translates into conceptual clarity by, firstly, proposing a working definition for proxy wars, and, secondly, carrying out a structural-relational analysis of party dynamics in proxy wars to aid the debate on causal explanations. Goals structure the Beneficiary's role in the dynamic by setting a Target-related end, and preferences optimize the Proxy's position vis-a-vis the Target. This is consistent with Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham's observation that indirect intervention is conditioned by the intervener's motivation as well as their potential options for doing so.
More so, it draws on Gleditsch's observations that the transnational dimensions of civil wars result not just from direct contagion, but also through actor-specific mechanisms 91 , and 20 reiterates Salehyan's emphasis that the relationship should be understood as a variant of a strategic partnership 92 . It differs, however, from San-Akca's recent theorisation which presented a simultaneous, two-tiered selection mechanism: from supporting state to proxy, and from proxy to supporting state.
By emphasising the role of the Proxy's preference, the article's contribution reaffirms San-Akca's second 'selection' dynamic. It also brings the Proxy into the centre of causal explanations as an attempt to capture actor agency and the inherent variation of why it accepts delegation of violence. It is important to note that in the absence of the proposed terminological assessment, both the agency and variation of the Proxy's motivation would struggle to gain causal weight due to the implications of subordination implied by labels such as 'client', 'pawn', or 'puppet'. As such, instead of framing their participation as motived by goals, I contend that preferences are a stronger explanatory variant because, most often, the Proxy is already in a clearly defined antagonist relationship with the Target.
In most cases, proxy wars unfold against the background of on-going wars where the ProxyTarget relationship is set.
The complexity of the Syrian civil war shows this accurately with the rebels receiving support already being involved in a strategic contest with the government and with each other. The United Nations' middleman in Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, characterised the situation in Syria by noting this exact overlap, namely that the war 'is at the same time, a civil war, a sectarian war and a proxy war.' 93 This was made possible by regional dynamics 21 which have exerted a powerful pull on the conflict: the Turkish bid for neo-Ottomanism 94 ,
the Iranian-Saudi Arabia rivalry, 95 Israel's pursuit for security at a time of Iranian push for hegemony 96 , and a growing realisation by Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi
Arabia of the diminishing prospects of externally guaranteed security. As such, by July 2018, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) had become Turkey's proxy, the Kurds had assumed their historical proxy partnership with the United States going back the 1970s, and Iran had employed a vast network of proxy militias manned and trained by Hezbollah to transform
Syria into an outpost of Iranian power. 97 To see the analytical value of preference in this context, consider the example of the Kurds. In assuming the role of proxies 98 , the armedbranches of the various Kurdish factions across Syria acted on a manifested preference for the Unites States. The Obama administration considered the Kurds to be a trusted 'partner' to fight ISIS 99 , and the Trump administration continued cooperation with them as 'foreign partners' 100 . In doing so, the Kurds exchanged strategic utility for political recognition and legitimization which has been crucial in maintaining a supposed distance from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and managing the Turkish opposition to their territorial claims. 101 For its part, Turkey co-opted factions of the Iraqi Kurds as a proxy counterweight to the emerging Rojava territorial formation at its border with Syria 102 .
The example of the Kurds also shows that preference does not imply proxies do not seek specific aims. In fact, preference presents an opportunity to differentiate between purely selfish reasons and more complex strategic associations. by pitting other local actors against it whenever the group acted in its own interests 109 . As discussed above, the Syrian civil war has seen staggering regional intervention all informed by individual goals, and not commitments to rebel causes.
Turkey's interest in supporting the FSA placed Syria second to the existential threat the PKK pose. Saudi Arab willingness and quick reaction to rebel needs is linked to Iranian rivalry rather than to the prospects of a democratic country. 110 Similarly, Iran has focused on Syria as the collapse of the regime would leave Iran exposed in its confrontation with regional enemies, directly affect its ability to provide support to Hezbollah, and thwart the country's naval ambitions 111 . Finally, while Russia proceeded with a direct military intervention aimed at projecting a long-sought power-broker status at the international level, the United States oscillated on the issue of rebel support, and after initial reluctance, opted for a covert operation centred on the FSA and the armed wings of the Kurds. The decision involved a process of vetting which could be understood as preference, but as Clinton explained, it was the fear of blowback and the publication of a CIA report on the long history of failed proxy wars that informed the decision not to provide support 112 context in which it emerged. As such, it enlisted the Kurds in an effort considered both inconsistent and highly conditional, but accepted, as explained, through a high preference for the United States. 114 With the Trump administration now committed to withdrawing from Syria, the future of the civil war is left to the Turkey-Iranian-Russian triumvirate.
However, any plan of moving forward must consider the wider regional implications given the pressures of a counterpoise from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, all employing their own proxies.
The Middle Eastern cauldron of proxy wars shows how the goal-preference heuristic presents the problem as constitutive of heterarchical relationships, and not hierarchical ones. In doing so it removes subordination and compliance, restoring much needed internal coherence to the idea of 'proxy war'. It provides a clearer sense of the how the dynamics between parties involved in proxy wars come about, allowing future research to turn to explaining other issues such as the conditions that make it more likely to take shape, and, most importantly, its consequences.
Conclusion 26
When Coker wondered about the role of language in political concepts he asked a simple question, 'What's in a name?'. His answer was as short and relevant as the question itself: 'Plenty' 115 . The advantage of this discussion is that it linked two systems often ignored in relation to security matters: the terminological one and the conceptual one. This analysis of proxy wars deconstructed a long-standing misunderstanding in the study of delegation of violence, namely its messy vernacular and its effects on the properties of the concept it describes. The overall aim was not to add more to exciting jargon, but to add a muchneeded layer of reflection on how we conceptualise and theorise proxy wars as a contemporary security challenge.
First, the discussion evaluated the terminological roster of labels used to characterise the parties engaged in proxy wars. A focus on the proxy war lexicon addressed the fact that process of naming and selecting terminology imports substantive value to the concept itself, to the framework developed to assess it, and to the range of solutions we seek to answer it. 116 The aim was to demonstrate that lack of semantic precision influences the overall concept, its definition, and its utility. To do so, the article developed the endorsement-enforcement matrix from the assumption that 'political concepts are doubly related to a socio-linguistical context from which they emanate and which they seek to interpret and shape'. 117 Applied to the literature on proxy war and external supposed it showed the inadequacy of the existing lexicon. By making the case for the use of 'beneficiary', 'proxy', and 'target', the article paved the way for further theory building able 27 to advance the debate and answer relevant policy questions. The need for such an analysis was nowhere more evident than in the remarks of former British Foreign Secretary, Boris
Johnson, who accused Iran and Saudi Arabia of 'puppeteering and playing proxy wars' 118 , creating a cabinet impasse that jeopardised the British strategy towards the Syrian civil war.
Johnson's remarks show that language is a powerful tool with a tremendously transformative power, and the analysis used the endorsement-enforcement matrix to show how choices over labels in proxy wars became choices over the definition and explanation of the phenomenon itself. The article addressed this problem by drawing a theoretical framework that added the goal-preference heuristic to the current discussion on causality.
This shifted the discussion to the essence of the matter, the triadic strategic interaction.
More importantly, in introducing the preference-goal heuristic, the article offers a vantage point from which future research can develop. The article's empirical backbone was the complex set of Middle Eastern proxy wars, and this showed how varied the extent of waging proxy wars can be. As John Bew put it, 'much dry tinder remains in these overlapping proxy wars' 119 with these conflicts engulfing local, sub-national, national, regional, and international actors. Nevertheless, the structural-relational analysis of proxy war party dynamics is a step forward because it helps open a more in-depth inquiry into proxy wars. One such potential avenue is the comparative assessment of why states wage proxy wars starting from the goalpreference heuristic. By developing a range of goals and by setting up degrees of preference, future research can set forth a more comprehensive typology of logics of violence behind 28 waging proxy wars. This will no doubt move both research and policy closer to developing strategies to confront and counter the messy military and political realities of proxy wars. 
